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Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 INR-05 L-02

NSAE-00 NSC-05 RSC-01 OES-03 FEAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03

H-01 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 OIC-02 OMB-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 TRSE-00 BIB-01 AF-04 ARA-06 EA-06

NEA-06 /106 W
---------- 015751
R 231445Z DEC 74
FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5337
INFO AEC GERMANTOWN
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L IAEA VIENNA 10584

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, TECH, IAEA
SUBJ: FURTHER VIEWS OF IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL ON FUTURE
OF THE NPT

REF: (A) IAEA VIENNA 4657 (NOTAL)
(B) IAEA VIENNA 6175 (NOTAL)

1. DIRECTOR GENERAL EKLUND MADE A FORCEFUL PRESENTATION
TO ME DECEMBER 19 ON HIS CONCERNS RE THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE
OF THE NPT. MUCH OF WHAT HE SAID WAS A REPEAT OF VIEWS
EXPRESSED IN JULY (SEE REF B, WHICH DESERVES RE-READING).
MAIN THRUST OF HIS ARGUMENT IS THAT, BARRING THE TAKING
OF EQUALLY STRONG ALTERNATE MEASURES WHICH HE HAS NOT
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SEEN AND DOES NOT VISUALIZE, THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIER STATES

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SHOULD NOW REQUIRE NPT ADHERENCE AS A CONDITION FOR EXPORT.

2. SEVEN MONTHS AFTER INDIAN EXPLOSION, SAID EKLUND, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SUPPORTERS OF THE TREATY PLAN TAKE SERIOUS MEASURES TO RESPOND TO THE PROLIFERATION THREAT. IT LOOKED LIKE INDIA HAD GOTTEN AWAY WITH IT; WHAT WOULD BE THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE SECOND EXPLOSION? THERE HAVE BEEN NO RATIFICATIONS OF THE NPT BY ANY OF THE IMPORTANT HOLD-OUT STATES, AND NO VISIBLE INDICATIONS THAT THE NPT SUPPORTERS INTEND TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. HE CITED ITALY AS THE CLASSIC EXAMPLE, REPEATING HIS WELL-KNOWN POSITION THAT WITHOUT ITALIAN RATIFICATION IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THE WHOLE NPT STRUCTURE WILL BEGIN TO COLLAPSE.

3. HE EMPHASIZED THAT NO ONE SHOULD BE LULLED INTO A FALSE SENSE OF EASE OVER THE OUTCOME OF THE 1974 UN DEBATE ON NON-PROLIFERATION. THE FACT IS, NOTHING WAS CHANGED BY THE DEBATE OR THE RESOLUTIONS, AND NO POSITIVE STEPS WERE TAKEN TO APPLY THE KIND OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE WHICH WOULD BE NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN THE NPT REGIME. HE WAS GRATEFUL, OF COURSE, FOR THE OVERT SUPPORT FROM USG AND OTHERS FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND THE COMMITMENT TO STRENGTHEN THE AGENCY. THIS WOULD HELP IN THE SHORT-TERM, BUT IN THE LONG TERM THE AGENCY COULD NOT SERVE AS THE GUARDIAN OF THE NPT. THE TREATY, IN HIS VIEW, COULD ONLY BE SAVED BY THE STRONG AND POSITIVE ACTION OF THE SUPPLIER STATES, AND THERE COULD BE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR US LEADERSHIP IN THIS ENDEAVOR.

4. EKLUND REVIEWED AGAIN HISTORY OF US PARTICIPATION IN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE NON-PROLIFERATION (PARA 2 REFTEL B), AND IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS, AND WONDERED WHY WE WERE, IN THIS CRITICAL PERIOD, FAILING TO BUILD ON THE STRONG FOUNDATION WE HAD ALREADY CREATED. HE REALIZED THAT THE FRENCH ATTITUDE CREATED PROBLEMS BUT DID NOT THINK THIS WAS INSUPERABLE. FRANCE WOULD HAVE TO COME ALONG IF CONFRONTED WITH STRONG COMMON POLICIES ON THE PART OF OTHER NUCLEAR EXPORTERS. THIS WOULD TAKE CONFIDENTIAL

TIME AND PATIENCE BUT WAS ACHIEVABLE.

5. AS FOR THE SOVIETS, EKLUND HAD JUST MADE A SIMILAR PRESENTATION ON THE NPT TO AMBASSADOR ARKADIEV. ARKADIEV, WHILE EXPRESSING CONCERN, HAD REPEATED THE SOVIET VIEW (WHICH EKLUND NOTED WAS ALSO THAT OF THE US) THAT NPT STATUS COULD NOT PRACTICALLY BE APPLIED IN ALL CASES AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR NUCLEAR EXPORTS. EKLUND ADMITTED

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THAT PERHAPS HIS APPROACH WAS OVER-SIMPLIFIED BUT HE FAILED TO SEE ANY ALTERNATIVE STEPS BEING TAKEN BY THE SUPPLIERS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE SAME OBJECTIVE, NAMELY, ASSURE EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS ON THE ENTIRE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE IN IMPORTING COUNTRIES. EKLUND FELT SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY GO ALONG WITH ANYTHING THE US SUGGESTED BUT THEY WOULD THEMSELVES TAKE NO SERIOUS INITIATIVE.

6. EKLUND, IN COMMENTING ON THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, SAID HE FEARED IT WOULD BE A STERILE OPERATION, WITH EMPHASIS ON SIMPLY MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO, WHILE IGNORING THE REAL PROBLEMS OF PROLIFERATION WHICH STEMMED FROM THE NON-UNIVERSALITY OF THE TREATY. HE HAD NO MAGICAL SUGGESTIONS TO MAKE BUT FELT IMPELLED URGE US TO RETHINK THE PROBLEM. HE RE-EMPHASIZED THAT IAEA SAFEGUARDS COULD, IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, ONLY BE AS EFFECTIVE AS THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE MAJOR NUCLEAR STATES WOULD DICTATE.

7. WHILE KEEPING MY COMMENTS IN GENERAL TERMS, I REASSURED HIM THAT THE US WAS NOT IDLE AND WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK STRONGLY TOWARD THE OBJECTIVE OF NON-PROLIFERATION. I COULD HOPE, AND EXPECT, THAT HE WOULD SEE MORE TANGIBLE RESULTS IN THE NOT-TOO-DISTANT FUTURE.PORTER

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